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Rational Egoism of Future Persons

- David Brink; Rational Egoism, Self and Others, Identity, Character and Morality, Cambridge, 1990.

- David Brink; Sidgwick and the Rationale for Rational Egoism, Essays on Henry Sidgwick, Bart Schultz, Cambridge University Press, 1992.

- David Brink; Rational Egoism and the Separateness of Persons, Oxford, 1997.

- T. L. S. Sprigge; The Rational Foundations of Ethics, London, 1988.

- J. Brenton Stearns; Ecology and the Indefinite Unborn, October, 1972.

- Robert Shaver; Rational egoism, Cambridge University Press, 1999.

- Donald Rutherford; Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, Cambridge University Press, 1995.

- Henry Richardson; Commensurability as a Prerequisite of Rational Choice, History of Philosophy Quarterly, 1991.

- Robert Nozick; The Nature of Rationality, (Princeton University Press, 1993.

- John Harsanyi; Morality and the theory of rational behavior, Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge University Press, 1982.

- William Frankena; Concepts of Rational Action in the History of Ethics, Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 9, Nos. 2-3 (Summer-Fall 1983).

- John Bigelow and Pargetter Robert; Morality, Potential Persons and Abortion, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, April 1988.

- Jonathan Bennett; On Maximizing Happiness, Obligations to Future Generations, Philadelphia, 1978.

- Nick Fotion and Jan C. Heller; Contingent Future Persons, Dordrecht, 1997.

- Larry Temkin; Rethinking the Good, Moral Ideals, and the Nature of Practical Reasoning: A Critical Examination of Part Four of Reasons and Persons, Oxford, 1997.

- R. I. Sikora; Is It Wrong to Prevent the Existence of Future Generations? Obligations to Future Generations, Philadelphia, 1978.

- Thomas Schwartz; Obligations to Posterity, Obligations to Future Generations, Philadelphia, 1978.

- Derek Parfit; Reasons and Persons, Oxford University Press, 1984.

- Gregory Kavka; The Futurity Problem, Obligations to Future Generations, Philadelphia, 1978.

- Michael Lockwood; Hare on Potentiality: A Rejoinder, Contingent Future Persons, Dordrecht, 1997.

- Roderick Chisholm; Defining Intrinsic Value, Analysis, Vol. 41, No. 2 (March 1981).

- Tyler Cowen; What Do We Learn From the Repugnant Conclusion?, Ethics, 106 (July 1996).

- Rem Edwards; Pleasures and Pains: A Theory of Qualitative Hedonism, Ithaca, 1979.

- Fred Feldman; On the Intrinsic Value of Pleasures, Ethics, 107 (April 1997).

- Irwin Goldstein; Why People Prefer Pleasure to Pain, Philosophy, 55 (1980).

- Richard Hall; Are Pains Necessarily Unpleasant?, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. XLIX, 1989.

- Shelly Kagan and Peter Vallentyne; Infinite Value and Finitely Additive Value Theory, The Journal of Philosophy Vol. XCIV, 1997.

bibliographies

Rational Egoism of Future Persons